Book Review: F. J. Mootz III and G. H. Taylor, eds. Gadamer and Ricoeur: Critical Horizons for Contemporary Hermeneutics (New York/London: Continuum, 2011), 297 pp. by Vallée, Marc-Antoine
  Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies, Vol 3, No 2 (2012), pp. 171-173 
ISSN 2155-1162 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2012.153 
http://ricoeur.pitt.edu 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 
United States License. 
 
This journal is published by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as part of its 
D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Book  Review  
F. J. Mootz III and G. H. Taylor, eds. Gadamer and Ricoeur: Critical Horizons for 
Contemporary Hermeneutics (New York/London: Continuum, 2011), 297 pp.  
Marc-­‐‑Antoine  Vallée    
EHESS (Paris)  
    
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          
Vol  3,  No  2  (2012)        ISSN  2155-­‐‑1162  (online)        DOI  10.5195/errs.2012.153        http://ricoeur.pitt.edu        
Book  Review  
F. J. Mootz III and G. H. Taylor, eds. Gadamer and Ricoeur: Critical Horizons for 
Contemporary Hermeneutics (New York/London: Continuum, 2011), 297 pp.  
Five  years  ago,  it  was  totally  impossible  to  find  a  book  entirely  dedicated  to  a  systematic  
study   of   the   complex   relations   between   the   hermeneutics   of   Gadamer   and   Ricoeur.   This   was  
quite  surprising  if  we  consider  the  importance  of  these  two  philosophers  to  the  development  of  a  
hermeneutical   philosophy   over   the   last   century.   Fortunately,   it   seems   that   the   relevance   of   a  
critical  discussion  on  Gadamer’s  and  Ricoeur’s  hermeneutics  has  recently  become  more  obvious,  
first   with   the   publication   of   Daniel   Frey’s   book   on   L’interprétation   et   la   lecture   chez   Ricoeur   et  
Gadamer  (2008),  and  now  with  this  initiative  of  Francis  J.  Mootz  III  and  George  H.  Taylor  to  bring  
into  conversation  "ʺGadamerian  and  Ricoeurian  scholars"ʺ   in  one  volume.  The  result  of  this  well-­‐‑
inspired   idea   is   a   book   containing   twelve   chapters   studying,   from   different   perspectives,   the  
agreements   and   disagreements   between   Gadamer’s   and   Ricoeur’s   philosophies,   not   without  
significant   convergences   and   divergences   between   the   authors.   The   book   is   divided   into   three  
parts:  the  first  one,  on  "ʺHistory"ʺ,  strangely  contains  only  one  paper  (by  P.  Christopher  Smith);  the  
second  part,  entitled  "ʺEngagements"ʺ,  includes  seven  chapters  on  central  questions  for  a  dialogue  
between  Gadamer  and  Ricoeur;  finally,  the  third  part  offers  four  "ʺExtensions"ʺ  to  this  conversation  
by   testing   original   applications   of   both   hermeneutics.   Since   it   is   impossible   to   give   a   detailed  
review  of  each  of  these  chapters,  I  would  simply  like  to  identify  some  of  the  main  issues  raised  by  
this  book.    
As   expected,   many   chapters   of   this   volume,   in   one   way   or   another,   insist   on   the  
hermeneutical   theses,   common   to   Gadamer   and   Ricoeur,   on   our   fundamental   belonging   to  
history,   tradition   and   community,   and   question   the   possibility   of   developing   a   critical  
hermeneutics  in  response  to  this  belonging.  The  paper  of  P.  Christopher  Smith  on  the  relations  of  
Gadamer   and  Ricoeur   to  Heidegger’s  phenomenological  hermeneutics   opens   the  discussion  by  
showing  how  these  three  thinkers  put  forward  divergent  views  on  our  belonging  to  tradition  and  
community.  In  contrast  with  Heidegger’s  imperative  of  a  hermeneutical  Destruktion,  formulating  
the   task   to   liberate   the   Dasein   of   a   fossilized   tradition   and   the   falseness   of   the   community,  
Gadamer   follows   something  more   like   "ʺhermeneutical  Konstruktion"ʺ,   by   describing   an   event   of  
truth  appearing  in  a  dialogue  with  tradition  and  in  the  participation  in  a  community.  Against  the  
idea  of  a  solitary  Dasein,  Gadamer  and  Ricoeur  insist  on  the  relationships  of  the  self  with  others,  
but  in  different  ways:  "ʺFor  Ricoeur  the  emphasis  is  on  the  relationship  of  two  individuals  to  each  
other.  For  Gadamer,  on  the  other  hand,  the  relationship  is  tripartite:  individuals  […]  are  related  
to  each  other  by  a  third  in  which  they  participate,  the  music,  the  game,  the  conversation,  in  which  
they   are   joined"ʺ   (35).   Regarding   this   difference   of   emphasis,   we   find   a   convergent   analysis   in  
David  Vessey’s  chapter  on  "ʺPaul  Ricoeur’s  and  Hans-­‐‑Georg  Gadamer’s  Diverging  Reflections  on  
Recognition"ʺ   when   he   underwrites   Gadamer’s   focus   on   the   belonging   of   the   individuals   to   a  
shared  background  in  his  criticism  of  I-­‐‑Thou  accounts  of  intersubjectivity.    
Therefore,   these   analyses   raise   the   following   question:   is   there   only   a   difference   of  
emphasis   between  Gadamer’s   and   Ricoeur’s   approaches   or   is   there   a   real   opposition   between  




Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          
Vol  3,  No  2  (2012)        ISSN  2155-­‐‑1162  (online)        DOI  10.5195/errs.2012..153        http://ricoeur.pitt.edu    
172  
  
of   Belonging   and   Distanciation   in   Gadamer   and   Ricoeur."ʺ   Refusing   to   oppose   unilaterally  
Gadamer’s  belonging  to  Ricoeur’s  distanciation,  Westphal’s  main  thesis  is  that  both  hermeneutics  
explore   the  dialectic  of  belonging  and  distanciation.  This  means,  on   the  one  hand,   that  Ricoeur  
also  assumes  a  strong  thesis  on  our  belonging  and  that   this  belonging   is  presupposed   in  any  I-­‐‑
Thou  relationship.  On  the  other  hand,  it  implies  that  there  is  some  legitimate  place  in  Gadamer’s  
hermeneutics   for   distanciation,   even   if   this   moment   of   distanciation   is   underdeveloped   in   his  
work.  So  the  answer  to  our  question  is  necessarily  more  complex  and  dialectical  than  expected  at  
first  sight,  but  it  doesn’t  exclude  a  priori  the  possibility  of  true  disagreements.    
All  this  discussion  also  leads  to  a  second  question:  is  there  a  place  for  a  critical  instance  in  
hermeneutics,  and  if  so,  where  can  we  find  it?  Here  the  division  between  the  scholars  is  obvious.  
Some   pretend   that   a   critical   principle   is   lacking   in   Gadamer’s   hermeneutics   and,   as   a  
consequence,   that  we  should  pay  more  attention   to  Ricoeur’s   thinking  on   this   issue.  This   is   the  
case,  among  others,  for  Andreea  Deciu  Ritivoi  in  her  study  of  the  concept  of  tradition  in  Gadamer  
and  Ricoeur.  Her  main  goal  is  to  promote  the  emancipative  resources  in  Ricoeur’s  philosophy  in  
order   to   respond   to   the   criticisms   of   Habermas   and   Foucault   and   to   edify   hermeneutics   as   a  
"ʺproject  of   liberation."ʺ  To   reach   this  goal,   she  wants   to  offer   "ʺa   revised   conception  of   tradition"ʺ  
(68),   making   use   of   the   dialectical   tensions   described   by   Ricoeur   between   tradition   and  
distanciation  and  between  ideology  and  utopia.  By  contrast,  other  authors   like  Francis  J.  Mootz  
III   maintain   that   nothing   is   lacking   in   Gadamer   if   we   take   a   closer   look   at   his   hermeneutics.  
Mootz’s   contribution   to   this   volume   is   precisely   to   argue   that   "ʺthe   rhetorical   dimension   of  
Gadamer’s   philosophical   hermeneutics   provides   the   basis   for   the   development   of   critical  
hermeneutics"ʺ  (89).  And  Mootz  wants  to  show  that  this  critical  moment  offers  a  more  radical  and  
fruitful   approach   for   social   critique   than   Ricoeur’s   dialectic   between   understanding   and  
explanation.   According   to   him,   the   problem  with   Ricoeur   is   that   he   gives   too  much   credit   to  
structuralism  and,  like  Habermas,  underestimates  the  critical  resources  inherent  to  dialogue  and  
rhetoric.  More  precisely:  "ʺRicoeur’s  mediation  failed  because  he  sought  a  philosophical  answer  to  
the   role   of   explanation   rather   than   seeking   a   rhetorical   account   of   the  distanciating   features   of  
dialogue"ʺ  (91).        
This   interrogation  on   the  best   approach   for   critical  hermeneutics   is  undoubtedly   at   the  
heart   of   other   contributions   to   this   volume.   This   is   the   case   of   George   Taylor’s   paper   on  
"ʺUnderstanding  as  Metaphoric,  Not  a  Fusion  of  Horizons"ʺ,  defending  the  relevance  of  Ricoeur’s  
metaphorical   model   of   understanding   against   Gadamer’s   account.   His   argument   is   that  
"ʺGadamer’s   notion   of   the   fusion   of   horizon   [sic]   mistakenly   claims   the   availability   of   an  
underlying   commonality,   while   Ricoeur   correctly   emphasizes   the   notion   of   understanding   as  
metaphoric   –   the   creation   of   similarity   across   difference"ʺ   (104).   But   the   issue,   here   again,   is   to  
establish  whether  we  have  a  real  opposition  or  only  a  difference  of  emphasis.  On  the  one  hand,  
Ricoeur  himself  sometime  uses  Gadamer’s  metaphor  to  describe  the  event  of  understanding  and,  
on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  possibility  of  a  fusion  of  horizons  without  the  presupposition  of  a  
difference   between   the  horizons.   Taylor’s   aim   is   precisely   to  distinguish   these   two   accounts   of  
understanding  without  covering  over  what  they  share.  In  a  similar  way,  Bernard  P.  Dauenhauer  
also   takes  note  of  considerable  agreements  and  some  crucial  differences  between  Gadamer  and  
Ricoeur,  in  his  paper  on  the  usefulness  of  Ricoeur’s  work  on  translation  to  promote  a  "ʺresponsible  
political  practice"ʺ  based  on  an  ethics  of  hospitality.  According  to  Dauenhauer,  we  find  in  Ricoeur  
a  stronger  sense  of  our  failures  to  understand  each  other,  that  are  not  only  avoidable  problems,  
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difference   constitutes   the   background   of   Dauenhauer’s   argument   about   the   fruitfulness   of  
Ricoeur’s  model  of  translation  for  practical  philosophy.  His  argument  about  failures  is  reinforced  
by  David  H.  Fisher’s  chapter  on  tragedy  and  practical  phronesis  in  Oneself  as  Another  arguing  that  
"ʺphronetic  wisdom"ʺ  always  has  to  deal  with  an  unavoidable  tragic  dimension.  
The  book  also  contains  papers  challenging  the  hermeneutics  of  Gadamer  and  Ricoeur  on  
specific   issues   or   from  horizons  more   distant   to   their  work.   In   this  way,   John  Arthos   asks   the  
question:   "ʺwhy   is   there   no   explicit   narrative   theory   in   Gadamer   anything   like   what   came   to  
occupy   a   central   role   in   Ricoeur’s   hermeneutics?"ʺ   (119).   Is   there   something   like   a   muthos   in  
Gadamer?   From   another   perspective,   Louise   D.   Derksen   and   Annemie   Halsema   question   the  
contribution  and  the  limits  of  a  hermeneutical  view  of  health  and  embodiment  for  feminist  theory  
in  a  paper  entitled  "ʺUnderstanding  the  Body:  The  Relevance  of  Gadamer’s  and  Ricoeur’s  View  of  
the   Body   for   Feminist   Theory"ʺ.   In   the   next   chapter   entitled   "ʺThings  Hermeneutics,"ʺ   David  M.  
Kaplan  sheds  light  on  the  possibility  to  apply  Gadamer’s  and  Ricoeur’s  ideas  in  the  field  of  a  new  
constructivist   philosophy   of   technology.   Finally,   Kathleen   Wright   discusses   some   theses   of  
Richard  E.  Palmer  and  Benjamin  A.  Elman  on  the  connections  between  Gadamer’s  hermeneutics  
and  New  Confucianism.          
To  summarize,  this  volume  represents  an  excellent  contribution  to  a  critical  debate  on  the  
legacy  of  Gadamer’s  and  Ricoeur’s  hermeneutics.  It  contains  penetrating  analysis  and  stimulating  
perspectives   on   the   complex   relations   between   the   two   hermeneutics,   raising   crucial   issues  
regarding,  among  others,   the  possibility  of  a  critical  hermeneutics.  Nevertheless,   it   is  a   little  bit  
surprising   to   find   in   such  a  book  a  paper  on  Gadamer  and  New  Confucianism  –   interesting   in  
itself,  but  not  really  in  touch  with  a  conversation  between  Gadamer  and  Ricoeur  –  while  there  is  
no   chapter   specifically   dedicated   to   the   central   theses   of   Gadamer   and   Ricoeur   on   our  
fundamental  belonging   to   language,   the  essential  metaphoricity  of   language  or   the  connections  
between  language  and  experience.  A  closer  look  at  these  key  theses  should  now  be  given.    
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